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The game-theoretic model of data transmission in a network of a given topology is presented.
Two players (network nodes) tend to send as many random data packagesas possible to the
ﬁnal nodes through one common node. Each playerhas a ﬁnite capacity buﬀer for storing
data packages. A system of costs for sending and storing data packages andrewards for the
successful package delivery is introduced. A dynamic conﬂict-controlled process is modelled
as a stochastic gamewith a ﬁnite set of states. The existence of the Nash equilibrium and a
cooperative solution is proved. The cooperative solution is a strategy proﬁle which maximizes
the total expected payoﬀ. The price of anarchy in the network is calculated. The price
comparesthe players’ payoﬀs in the Nash equilibrium and cooperative solution.
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Introduction.We propose a game-theoretic model of data transmission using slotted
ALOHA scheme [1–3]. There are two players (network nodes) who want to transmit
as many data packages of a unit capacity as possible. They may send the packages
independently or in cooperation and transitions are gone through the common node.
Players are not symmetric which means that data packages can appear at the nodes
with diﬀerent probabilities that do not vary in time. The time is assumed to be discrete.
Game-theoretic models of data transmission in the networks of diﬀerent topologies are also
considered in the papers [4, 5]. In particular, in [4] three models of data transmission in
the networks of diﬀerent topologies were presented in case of complete information about
the presence of packages at the other player. In [5] the authors consider a model of data
transmission based on slotted ALOHA scheme in the absence of complete information
on the presence of packages at the other player. In papers [4, 5] the Nash equilibria and
a cooperative solution are found. Moreover, these two equilibria are compared using the
price of anarchy. In the work [6], the authors provide an analysis of data transmission
in ALOHA scheme networks, namely, the Nash equilibrium in one-shot game with n
symmetric and asymmetric players.
Dynamic process of data transmission in a network of a given topology of slotted
ALOHA scheme is modeled as a stochastic game. Unlike [5], we assume that each node
(or player) has a ﬁnite capacity buﬀer at which the received data packages are stored
before transmission to the destination node. The stochastic model of data transmission is
presented in [7] and there is a relay node in data transmission scheme, which is considered
as a buﬀer for package keeping. Contrary to this approach we assume that each player
has a buﬀer to keep randomly appeared packages. When we ﬁnd the optimal players’
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strategies, the two approaches are used — non-cooperative and cooperative. We ﬁnd the
Nash equilibrium and cooperative solution according to these approaches.
Model. Consider the data transmission slotted ALOHA-like scheme represented in
Fig. 1. Players (Nodes) 1 and 2 tend to send data packages to the nodes r1 and r2,
respectively. As one can see from the data transmission scheme, the package should go
through the node of a unit capacity which is common for both players. Player i = 1,2
has a buﬀer of capacity ki, which means that it can possess from 0 to ki data packages
of a unit capacity at each time period. At the beginning of each time period, Players 1
and 2 may receive a data package of a unit capacity with probability ν1 ∈ (0,1) and
ν2 ∈ (0,1) respectively if at the beginning of the period he possesses less than ki packages.
The packages independently appear at nodes.
Figure 1. Data transmission scheme
In each time period, Player i = 1,2 can transmit only one package to the destination
node ri. In case both players simultaneously transit the packages, the packages are back to
the Nodes. For successful package delivery, it is necessary that only one Player transits the
package. If the package is delivered to the destination node, the player receives a payoﬀ of
1 minus the costs of a package transmission which is equal to c ∈ (0,1). The player bears
the costs of d ∈ [0,1) for one time period delay per each unit package, d≪ 1.
By the state of the system in time period t, we mean the pair (ω1(t), ω2(t)), where
ωi(t) ∈ {0,1, . . . , ki} is the number of data packages at Player i’s buﬀer, i = 1,2. The set
of the system states at any time period t is denoted by Ω, ∣Ω∣ = (k1 + 1)(k2 + 1). Let the
states be ω(1), . . ., ω(m), where m = (k1 + 1)(k2 + 1).
On the basis of the given assumptions we deﬁne a stochastic game with a ﬁnite state
set and ﬁnite action sets.
Stochastic game. The time is assumed to be discrete. The set of states at each time
period is Ω = {ω = (ω1, ω2) ∶ ωi ∈ [0, ki], i = 1,2}. At state ω the set of Player i’s actions is
Aωi that is
Aωi = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩{t,w}, if ωi > 0,{w}, if ωi = 0. (1)
In formula (1) action t means “to transmit” a package, w — “to wait”.
In state ω = (ω1, ω2), here ω1 = ω2 = 0, the payoﬀ function of Player i is equal
uωi (aω1 , aω2 ) = 0 for any i = 1,2, and both actions aω1 and aω2 are w. If ω = (ω1, ω2), ω1 > 0
and ω2 = 0, then the payoﬀ functions are deﬁned by matrix
((1 − c − d(ω1 − 1); 0)(−dω1; 0) ) ,
40 Вестник СПбГУ. Прикладная математика. Информатика... 2019. Т. 15. Вып. 1
where Player 1 chooses rows (row 1 correspond to action t, row 2 — to action w); Player
2 chooses a column. In case, when ω = (ω1, ω2), ω1 = 0 and ω2 > 0, then the players’ payoﬀ
functions are deﬁned by matrix
((0; 1 − c − d(ω2 − 1)) (0;−dω2)) .
If ω = (ω1, ω2), ω1 > 0 and ω2 > 0, then each player has two actions t and w and players’
payoﬀ functions in this state are deﬁned by
( (−c − dω1;−c − dω2) (1 − c − d(ω1 − 1);−dω2)(−dω1; 1 − c − d(ω2 − 1)) (−dω1;−dω2) ) .
Let assume that the players’ strategies in the whole game are stationary which
seems to be a natural assumption in data transmission modeling. The stationary strategy
depends on the state and does not depend on time and the history of the stage. We
suppose that the player does not know the number of packages at the other player’s
buﬀer. And we also assume that Player i uses the same strategy in any state (ωi, ωj),
where ωi ∈ {1, . . . , ki − 1}, and may be the other strategy in state (ωi, ωj), when ωi = ki.
Therefore, Player i’s mixed stationary strategy ηi is (pfi , pnfi ), i = 1,2, where pfi ∈ [0,1] is
a probability of choosing action t in any state (ωi, ωj), j ≠ i, j = 1,2, if ωi = ki, ωj ∈ [0, kj]
(probability of transmitting a package when the buﬀer of Player i is full); pnfi ∈ [0,1] is
a probability of choosing action t in any state (ωi, ωj), j ≠ i, j = 1,2, if ωi ∈ [1, ki − 1],
ωj ∈ [0, kj] (probability of transmitting a package when the buﬀer of Player i is not full).
It is supposed that the Player i chooses the same probabilities of transition when the
buﬀer is not full, ωi ∈ [0, ki − 1]. One may consider another class of stationary strategies,
e. g., the probabilities of transition may be diﬀerent for diﬀerent number of packages at
the buﬀer. Obviously, this increases the number of pure strategies and strategy proﬁles
and the number of calculations for ﬁnding the equilibria. The stationary strategy proﬁle is(η1, η2) = ((pf1 , pnf1 ), (pf2 , pnf2 )). Denote by Ξi the set of stationary strategies of Player i.
The set of pure stationary strategies of Player i = 1,2 is {(0,0), (0,1), (1,0), (1,1)}.
Now we deﬁne transition probabilities π(ω′′/ω′, η) to state ω′′ ∈ Ω from state ω′ ∈ Ω if
strategy proﬁle η is realised. They are π(ω′′/ω′, η), which is represented in table 1, where
ω = (ωi, ωj), i = 1,2, j = 1,2, i ≠ j, and η = (ηi, ηj) = ((pfi , pnfi ), (pfj , pnfj )). The transition
probabilities for the pairs of states, which are not presented in table 1 are null.
We have deﬁned two-person stochastic game G by a tuple
⟨Ω,{Aωi }i=1,2;ω∈Ω,{uωi }i=1,2;ω∈Ω,{Ξi}i=1,2,{π(ω′′/ω′, η)}ω′′∈Ω,ω′∈Ω,η∈Ξ1×Ξ2 , δ⟩,
where δ ∈ (0,1) is a common discount rate.
We consider the discounted expected payoﬀ as a payoﬀ in stochastic game G given by
Ei(η) = π0(I − δΠ(η))−1ui(η). (2)
In formula (2) π0 is an initial probability distribution over the set of states, I is an identity
matrix of size m, Π(η) is a m×mmatrix of transition probabilities π(⋅/⋅, η), whose (l, n)-th
entry is a probability of transition from state ω(l) to state ω(n), when strategy proﬁle η is
realised.
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Table 1. Transition probabilities
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Payoﬀ function ui(η) deﬁnes the payoﬀ for any state ω. The values of function
ui(ηi, ηj), i, j = 1,2, i ≠ j, are represented in table 2.
We consider two approaches (cooperative and non-cooperative) to ﬁnd a solution
in game G. We consider the Nash equilibrium as an optimality principle within a non-
cooperative approach. Following a cooperative approach we ﬁnd the cooperative solution
maximizing the total players’ expected payoﬀ in game G.
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Table 2. Payoﬀ functions
uωi (η) u
ω
j (η) ω = (ωi, ωj)
0 0 ωi = ωj = 0
0 pnfj (1 − c + d) − dωj ωi = 0,
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Theorem. There exist the Nash equilibrium and cooperative solution in game G.
P r o o f . Existence of the Nash equilibrium follows from Fink’s results (see [8]) using
the fact that the set of states in game G is ﬁnite and the set of actions of any player is
also ﬁnite for any state ω. The cooperative solution η∗ is an argument of a well-known
dynamic program problem and it always exists. Moreover, it is a pure stationary strategy
proﬁle.
To estimate the selﬁshness in the network we calculate the price of anarchy [9] given
by
PoA(G) =
2∑
i=1
Ei(η∗)
min
η∈NE(G)
2∑
i=1
Ei(η) , (3)
where NE(G) is the set of the Nash equilibria in game G. One can notice the PoA is not
deﬁned if the sum in the denominator in (3) is null.
Simulation study.As an example we consider gameGwith the following parameters:
c = 0.2, d = 0.03. Let Player 1 has a smaller buﬀer of capacity k1 = 2 contrary to
Player 2’s buﬀer of capacity k2 = 4. Both players have the same discount factor 0.99.
The probabilities of package appearance at Players 1 and 2 are ν1 = 0.6 and ν2 = 0.2,
respectively. There are 15 states in the game. Let the game start with the state (0,0)
when there are no packages at the nodes. The set of pure stationary strategies for each
player is {(0,0), (0,1), (1,0), (1,1)}. Player i’s mixed stationary strategy ηi is (pfi , pnfi ),
i = 1,2. Transition matrix is of size 15×15 and it is a function of stationary strategy proﬁle
η = (η1, η2). To ﬁnd a cooperative solution we need to calculate the total players’ payoﬀ in
the whole game for each pure stationary strategy proﬁle (there are 16 such proﬁles) and
ﬁnd the maximal one. To ﬁnd the Nash equilibria in stochastic game G we use Lemke—
Howson algorithm [10–12]. For this we calculate the matrices of expected payoﬀs of Players
1 and 2 by formula (2) for each pure stationary strategy proﬁle. Therefore, we obtain two
payoﬀ matrices A and B for Players 1 and 2, respectively:
A = ⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
−5.8518 −5.8518 −5.8518 −5.8518
47.5200 −2.7638 5.0169 −5.8518
43.7829 34.8935 −12.9591 −20.9107
47.5200 38.7075 −7.5023 −20.9767
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠ ,
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B = ⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
−10.6254 15.8400 5.5014 15.8400−10.6254 15.3433 3.7837 15.8400−10.6254 −11.8717 −26.0360 −27.5207−10.6254 −12.3383 −21.0293 −28.2416
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠ .
Then we use these matrices in Lemke—Howson algorithm.
There are four Nash equilibria in bimatrix game with payoﬀ matrices (A,B): a) ξ1 =(0,0.0619,0,0.93819), ξ2 = (1,0,0,0) with payoﬀs 47.5200 and −10.6254 of Players 1 and
2, respectively; b) ξ1 = (0,0.9697,0,0.0303), ξ2 = (0,0.2672,0,0.7328)with payoﬀs −5.0266
and 14.5050 of Players 1 and 2, respectively; c) ξ1 = (0,1,0,0), ξ2 = (0,0,0,1) with payoﬀs−5.8518 and 15.8400 of Players 1 and 2, respectively; d) ξ1 = (1,0,0,0), ξ2 = (0,0,0,1)
with payoﬀs −5.8518 and 15.8400 of Players 1 and 2, respectively. The “worst” Nash
equilibrium, i. e. the Nash equilibrium with the smallest total players’ payoﬀ, is the second
one ξ1 = (0,0.9697,0,0.0303), ξ2 = (0,0.2672,0,0.7328). The equilibria in bimatrix game
corresponds to the Nash equilibria in stochastic game G in stationary strategies (η1, η2).
Mixed strategy η1 prescribes to choose pure strategy (0,1) with probability 0.9697 and(1,1) with probability 0.0303. Mixed strategy η2 prescribes to choose pure strategy (0,1)
with probability 0.2672 and (1,1)with probability 0.7328. Both players randomize between
two strategies (0,1) and (1,1), but Player 1 with much higher probability 0.9697 chooses
strategy (0,1) contrary to Player 2 who chooses strategy (0,1) with probability 0.2672.
The total players’ payoﬀ in the Nash equilibrium is 9.4784.
The cooperative solution is (η1, η2), where η1 = (1,1), η2 = (0,0), with total players’
payoﬀ 36.8946. In cooperation Player 1 transmits a package in any state regardless his
buﬀer is full or not, and Player 2 never transmits packages. The price of anarchy in game
G is 3.8925. We do not discuss if the price of anarchy is respectively high. It may be
interpreted taking into account the costs of coordination of players’ strategies.
Figure 2. Price of anarchy as a function of probabilities ν1 and ν2
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The sums of the players’ payoﬀs in all Nash equilibria and cooperative solution are
positive. In case of negative total players’ payoﬀ in the “worst” Nash equilibrium, the
explanation of a price of anarchy is questionable. Therefore, in case of negative sum of
players’ payoﬀs in the Nash equilibrium the modiﬁcation of the state payoﬀ functions
(e. g., we may add a constant to all state payoﬀs to make them non-negative) should be
made to apply the price of anarchy.
The graph of the price of anarchy as a function of probabilities ν1 and ν2 is presented
on Fig. 2. For simulation we use the following parameters: c = 0.2, d = 0.03, k1 = 2, k2 = 4,
δ = 0.99, and the game starts with state (0,0). As one can observe from the graph, the
price of anarchy is non-monotonic function of probabilities ν1 and ν2. Calculations show
the regions of parameters ν1 and ν2 for which the PoA is large and the coordination of
players’ strategies may increase the total payoﬀ in more than 100 times in some cases.
Conclusion. We have constructed a model of the process of data transmission
with two participants using the theory of stochastic games. The existence of the Nash
equilibrium and a cooperative solution follows from well-known results based on the game
model. The results are illustrated by the numerical example. The model may be extended
in diﬀerent directions: (i) the packages may have diﬀerent priority to be sent; (ii) the
probabilities of package appearance at the nodes may vary on time; (iii) players’ strategies
may be diﬀerent, e. g., the probability to transmit a package maybe some particular
function of the number of packages at the player’s buﬀer; (iv) the mechanism of payoﬀ
transfers may be implemented to support realization of the cooperative solution.
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В работе представлена теоретико-игровая модель передачи данных в сети заданной кон-
фигурации. Цель двух игроков (вершин в сети) — переслать как можно больше паке-
тов данных в конечные вершины сети, используя одну общую вершину. Каждый игрок
имеет буферы конечной емкости для хранения вершин. Предложена система издержек
за пересылку и хранение пакетов, а также вознаграждений за успешные доставки па-
кетов. Динамический конфликтно-управляемый процесс моделируется стохастической
игрой с конечным множеством состояний. Доказано существование равновесия по Нэшу
и вектора кооперативных стратегий, при котором достигается максимальный суммар-
ный выигрыш игроков. Вычислена цена анархии в сети, с помощью которой сравни-
ваются выигрыши игроков в равновесии по Нэшу и наборе кооперативных стратегий.
Ключевые слова: передача данных, ALOHA, цена анархии, стохастическая игра.
Кон т а к т н а я и нформац и я:
Буре Владимир Мансурович — д-р техн. наук, проф.; v.bure@spbu.ru
Парилина Елена Михайловна – канд. физ.-мат. наук, доц.; e.parilina@spbu.ru
∗ Работа Е. М. Парилиной выполнена при финансовой поддержке Российского научного фонда
(проект № 17-11-01079).
Вестник СПбГУ. Прикладная математика. Информатика... 2019. Т. 15. Вып. 1
